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The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice:  
Theory and Evidence from Agricultural Policies 
 
Johan F.M. Swinnen,
 Alessandro Olper, Thijs Vandemoortele 
1.  Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the political economy of public policies, including 
seminal contributions of e.g. Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Becker (1983) and more recent 
contributions, especially on trade policies, by e.g. Hillman (1982), Magee et al. (1989), 
and Grossman and Helpman (1994). While much of this literature initially focused on 
explaining the level of policy interventions, subsequent studies focused on explaining the 
nature of the policies, i.e. why governments chose inefficient policies to redistribute 
income or protect certain groups (e.g. Cassing and Hillman, 1985; Rodrik, 1986; Coate 
and Morris, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). 
  However, this literature on the choice of instruments is mostly restricted to 
theoretical studies.
1 There are only a few empirical studies on the determinants of 
instrument choice, including Kono (2006) and Ederington and Minier (2006). 
  The objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
political economy of policy instrument choice by developing a general theoretical model 
and by testing its predictions with new historical and cross-country evidence from 
agricultural and food policies. The agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for 
studying the political economy of public policies. The sector is subject to heavy-handed 
governmental interventions throughout the world. Despite decades (even centuries) of 
                                                           
1 There is an extensive empirical literature analyzing the determinants of the level of public policies (e.g. 
Baldwin, 1985; Magee, 1994; 1997; Gawande and Krishna, 2001) including agricultural and food policies 
(e.g. Gardner, 1987; Olper, 2007; Swinnen et al., 2001). - 3 - 
economists’ arguments against agricultural subsidies and tariffs, political factors continue 
to dominate agricultural policy setting (including trade policy) in both rich and poor 
countries. The struggle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to conclude the Doha 
round of multilateral trade negotiations brought again to the forefront the important role 
that agricultural policy continues to play in international trade relations.  
In poor countries moreover, where agriculture is a very important share of the 
economy and where food is a major consumption item, the importance of agricultural 
policy as a public policy issue is obvious. However, also in rich countries agricultural 
policy remains disproportionately important compared to the relatively small share of 
agriculture in terms of economic output. For example in the EU, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) continues to absorb 42% of the entire EU budget in 2010. 
Despite a strong decline of agriculture in terms of employment and output in rich 
countries, agriculture and agricultural policy remains so important for them in their trade 
negotiations that they are willing to let the WTO negotiations collapse over disputes on 
agricultural policy.  
Agricultural and food policies have changed dramatically over the course of long-
term economic development and continue to vary widely among countries, across 
commodities, and in the choice of policy instruments used. Accordingly, the evolution of 
policies affecting this sector and the fundamental differences among countries provides 
an excellent empirical foundation for studying the determinants of policy choices.
2 
                                                           
2 As in the general literature, political economy studies of agricultural policy have focused primarily on 
explaining the level of policy intervention and less attention is paid to the explanation of the instruments 
used for intervention. See de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) and Swinnen (2010), for reviews of the literature. 
Studies have attempted to provide an explanation for the stylized facts on agricultural protection, such as 
the widely observed increase in agricultural protection when an economy grows (Anderson and Hayami, 
1986). Theoretical studies attempting to explain these and other facts have stressed the implications of 
organization costs on the political decision-making process (Gardner, 1987; Olson, 1990), structural factors - 4 - 
Studying agricultural policies also provides a quasi-natural experiment on the 
impact of the WTO. The distortionary effects of government interventions are equally 
dependent on the choice of the instrument as on the level of the intervention, a 
consideration recognized by the WTO through the classification of agricultural policy 
instruments in green, blue and amber boxes – with the green box for non-trade distorting 
policies instruments. This distinction between the level of support and the extent of 
market and trade distortions is at the heart of some important policy reforms, such as 
those of the EU’s CAP over the past two decades. It is generally acknowledged that the 
1993 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in the GATT and the current 
Doha WTO negotiations played an important role in this (Swinnen, 2008).  
Finally, an important reason to study agricultural policies is that there are good 
data available on instrument choice. The OECD annually publishes its indicators of 
support to agriculture for all OECD countries and provides disaggregation of these 
support instruments across countries and over time. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first review related literature. Next we 
present some stylized facts on instrument choice in agricultural and food policies. Then 
we develop a theoretical model and derive some key hypotheses. Afterwards we 
empirically test these hypotheses using an econometric study. The final section 
concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
affecting the distributional effects of agricultural protection (Anderson and Tyers, 1988; Honma and 
Hayami, 1986; Swinnen, 1994), the relative income position of agriculture (Bullock, 1992; de Gorter and 
Tsur, 1991; Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993), the transfer efficiency of agricultural policy (Gardner, 1983; 
Bullock, 1992; Bullock et al., 1999) and, more recently, political institutions like differences in electoral 
rules and the degree of democracy (Beghin and Kerallah, 1994; Swinnen et al., 2001; Olper, 2001; 2007; 
Olper and Raimondi, 2010). - 5 - 
2.  Related Literature 
Political economy explanations of instrument choice can be grouped into several 
categories.
3 
The imperfect information approach focuses on how differences in information of 
various interest groups and politicians affects their preference for certain policies. 
Because voters are assumed to be not or poorly informed about the effect of policy, 
politicians have an incentive to select less efficient policy instruments instead of more 
efficient (and more transparent) ones (Tullock, 1983; Olson, 1982). This approach 
includes the “obfuscation” explanation which argues that governments use policies which 
obfuscate the costs of the policies to those hurt by the policies or which obfuscate the 
transfer itself (Magee et al., 1989; Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Ray, 1981; Trebilcock et 
al., 1982). Politicians will try to obfuscate the transfer to hide the influence of interest 
groups and voters in order to keep their reputation clean (Coate and Morris, 1995) or to 
protect international relations (MacLaren, 1991).  
The policy obfuscation theory depends crucially on the assumption of rationally 
ignorant Downsian voters (Swinnen and van der Zee, 1993). With increasing voter 
sophistication, parties must disguise their redistributive activities more effectively. The 
better informed voters are, the more indirect policies, such as non-tariff barriers, (which 
are assumed to be more obfuscated) will arise, because they increase voter support for 
protectionist politicians. But simultaneously the equilibrium level of distortions will rise: 
the voter information paradox (Magee et al., 1989). Kono (2006) argues that electoral 
competition reinforces obfuscation effects as some policies are easier to explain to voters. 
                                                           
3 See also de Gorter (2008) for a recent review. - 6 - 
The obfuscation argument is often used to explain the persistence of agricultural price 
supports and tariffs in OECD countries, and to explain why non-budget methods of 
redistribution (such as tariffs) are politically superior to production subsidies and direct 
income payments (Lindbeck, 1985).  
The obfuscation argument is refuted by among others Becker (1976; 1983). He 
argues that competition among pressure groups favors ‘efficient’ instruments of 
redistribution, i.e. instruments that minimize deadweight costs per unit of transfer. 
‘Seemingly inefficient instruments’ will turn out to be efficient if all costs and benefits 
are taken into account: “I find it difficult to believe that most voters are systematically 
fooled about the effects of policies like quotas and tariffs that have persisted for a long 
time. I prefer instead to assume that voters have unbiased expectations, at least of 
policies that have persisted. They may overestimate the dead weight loss from some 
policies and underestimate it from others, but on the average they have a correct 
perception. This assumption is consistent with … ‘rational’ expectations” (Becker 1976: 
246-248).  
Models following this logic are sometimes referred to as the efficient redistribution 
approach. They are part of a larger class of models focusing on political competition as a 
key factor determining the choice of policies with rational agents having perfect 
information. Regarding instrument choice, models in which government policy choice is 
determined by politicians maximizing political support will yield results very similar to 
those where pressure groups lobby play the central role. Competition in the political 
market place, whether between interest groups, or between political parties, or both, - 7 - 
induce governments to choose policy instruments that minimize market distortions 
(Wittmann, 1989; Besley et al., 2010).
4  
A reason why inefficient policies may still be chosen by rational governments in a 
perfect information world is when they are used as compensation instruments in a larger 
political economy framework. Compensation through redistributive policies may be 
required to reduce opposition from those hurt by policies which increase aggregate 
welfare. This argument fits into the logic of models studying joint policy analysis of 
public goods and redistributive policies (Rausser, 1992; Swinnen and de Gorter, 2002).
5  
For example, Foster and Rausser (1993) show why governments may prefer price 
support over lump-sum transfers as price support allows to discriminate between 
heterogeneous producers. As a consequence, the total transfers with price support, 
including deadweight costs, may be less than with lump-sum transfers to satisfy a 
political need to compensate a minimum blocking coalition from vetoing efficiency-
enhancing government policies. In this respect, price distorting compensation schemes 
are the cheapest way of making an efficiency enhancing government policy politically 
acceptable. The Foster and Rausser (1993) argument is related to more recent theories of 
inefficient redistribution, based on contractual problems, such as those proposed by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu (2003), where inefficient policies and 
institutions are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups 
                                                           
4 See, Polo (1998) and Svensson (1998) for early formal analyses of how lopsided political competition 
may lead to excessive rent-seeking or lack of inefficient provision of public policy. 
5 Mueller (1989) makes a division between ‘allocative policies’ and ‘redistributive policies’. Rausser 
(1992) refers to efficiency-enhancing policies as ‘political economic-seeking transfers’ (PESTs) in contrast 
with redistributive policies called ‘political economic resource transactions (PERTs). Persson and Tabellini 
(2000; 2003) point to the different incentive structure of democratic institutions, contrasting special interest 
versus public interest policy. Applications to agriculture are, for example, the joint decision-making on 
public expenditures on agricultural research and on subsidies to farmers (de Gorter et al., 1992; Swinnen 
and de Gorter, 1998). - 8 - 
holding political power. Here the emphasis is on the commitment problems inherent in 
politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future 
actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such 
arrangements. 
Another set of studies focus on transaction costs. They typically argue that corret 
policy analyses should explicitly account for costs involved in the implementation, 
administration and enforcement of the policies (Coase, 1960, 1989; North, 1990). Coase 
(1989) refers to economic analyses that exclude transaction and administration costs as 
“blackboard economics” which has relevance only in the classroom but not in the real 
world. Taking into account real world transaction costs and constraints may change the 
evaluation of the relative efficiency of certain instruments (Dixit, 1996). 
Interestingly, the existence of transaction costs has been used both to defend and to 
disapprove the use of certain policies. Coase (1989) concludes that by ignoring 
transaction costs most studies underestimate the costs of government policy and that 
existing policies are even more inefficient than usually argued. In contrast, Munk (1989; 
1994) argues that including transaction costs in the analysis leads to the conclusion that 
existing agricultural policies are more efficient than often claimed since the transaction 
costs are low compared to other policies (like lump-sum transfers). Similarly, Vatn 
(2002) argues that the traditional argument in agricultural economics preferring 
decoupled and better targeted policies over price support policy, based on dead weight 
costs arguments, may no longer be correct when transaction costs are taken into account. 
A related argument is made by Mitchell and Moro (2006), who argue that compensation - 9 - 
through distortive policies, such as tariffs, may be more effective if one does not know ex 
ante the amount of transfer needed – as these information costs induce rent-seeking.  
A problem with the transaction costs approach to public policy is the limited 
empirical measures. Indeed, the size of transaction costs of different policies is only 
rarely measured (North, 1990; OECD, 2007; Rørstad et al., 2007). Although these 
reasons are understandable to some extent, they can hardly be used as an excuse for 
ignoring these costs in policy analysis, in particular since there is substantial ad hoc 
evidence that they do affect policy decisions in reality.
6 Therefore, a relevant analysis of 
instrument choice should include transaction costs. At the same time however, since data 
on transaction costs are very limited, we will need to make some assumptions in the 
empirical application on how to capture transaction costs.  
3.  Stylized Facts on Instrument Choice in Agricultural Policy 
It is impossible to review all the changes that took place in global agricultural and food 
policy instruments in one paper, let alone one section of a paper. Therefore we limit 
ourselves here to identify some important “stylized facts” in policy choice with which a 
theoretical model and its predictions should be consistent. We do so by drawing both on 
historical and on cross-country evidence. We first present some stylized facts on 
agricultural and food policies in Europe over the course of the past century and a half. 
Then, we present quantitative indications on instrument choice in OECD countries over 
the past 25 years. 
                                                           
6 For example, if one asks any policy-maker who was involved in the reform of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1990s, why production quota were not introduced in the grain sector as 
they were in the milk and sugar sector in the 1980s the answer one gets is invariably: production quota are 
impossible to administer and to enforce in the grain sector. Hence, the key issue is said to be policy 
transaction costs. - 10 - 
3.1.  European Agricultural and Food Policy instruments 1870-2010 
It is convenient to start around 1870 since Europe experienced essentially free trade in the 
1860s (Swinnen, 2009). Table 1 summarizes important changes in agricultural policy 
instruments since then.
7  
In reaction to dramatically declining grain world prices in the 1880s
8, import tariffs 
were introduced in several European countries such as France, Belgium, and Germany in 
the late 19th century.
9 The destruction caused by World War I resulted in the temporary 
suspension of most import tariffs since prices were high and supply low. After the war, 
production recovered and tariffs were gradually reintroduced. In the 1930s tariff rates 
were increased as surpluses began to appear and as demand dropped during the general 
economic depression. 
Around 1930 a series of non-tariff interventions emerged. A milling ratio imposed 
the use of domestic grain, and hence restricted the use of imported grain (mostly wheat 
and rye) for millers. This instrument to protect domestic grain producers was introduced 
in, for example, France, Germany, Norway, and Belgium. Import quotas for agricultural 
products were first used in France in 1931. In the 1930s and 1940s some countries also 
introduced minimum prices, export subsidies and marketing boards. Countries referred to 
the combination of various policy instruments as “market organization”.  
When the precursor to the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
created, many of these instruments and their administrations and implementing 
                                                           
7 These stylized facts draw importantly on Tracy (1989), Josling (2007) and Swinnen (2009). For recent 
political economy analysis of the historical evolution of US trade policy, see the interesting paper of Irwin 
(2008); for a broad country coverage, see the paper of Williamson (2003). 
8 Grain import prices declined strongly following increasing imports from overseas in the 1870’s. 
9 Exceptions were Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands which maintained free-trade positions for some 
time. - 11 - 
institutions
10 were integrated in the CAP. Initially, the core elements of the CAP were a 
market organization designed to maintain a minimum internal producer price. Three 
instruments were crucial components of the system: import tariffs, domestic state 
intervention purchases, and export subsidies. 
These support policies lead to structural surpluses, high costs for storage and export 
subsidies, and increasing global market distortions. To constrain the growing costs and 
distortions, the EEC introduced production quotas for sugar and milk in the 1980s. 
Because of implementation problems (i.e. transaction costs), the EU did not introduce 
production quota in other surplus markets such as grains and oilseeds, and opted instead 
to lower price support and tariffs and to compensate farmers through payments per 
hectare or per animal in the 1990s. 
In the 2000s, the EU further reduced price support and decoupled payment to farms 
from production by giving farms a so-called Single Farm Payment (SFP), on the basis of 
historical entitlements. While there is discussion on whether these payments are fully 
decoupled from production, there is general consensus that they are much less market 
distorting than earlier policy systems. 
It is important to understand that the CAP reforms over the past two decades were 
influenced by the GATT/WTO negotiations. The 1990s reforms (lowering of tariffs and 
introduction of direct payments) coincided with the conclusion of the 1994 GATT 
agreement (including the URAA). The 2000s reforms (decoupling payments) coincided 
with the WTO Doha Round negotiations. 
                                                           
10 During World War II, food distribution was strongly regulated to address food shortages and aid 
consumers. Administrations and institutions were set up to control production, trade, and consumption. 
While this system was liberalized after the war, the existing administration and institutions remained useful - 12 - 
In summary, some important conclusions from this brief historical review are (a) 
that the choice of instruments has changed strongly over time; (b) that initially mainly 
tariffs were used; (c) that substantially less distortionary policies have only emerged over 
the past 25 years; and (d) that shifts towards less distortionary policies have coincided 
with GATT negotiations/agreements. Before developing a model that is consistent with 
these observations, we will review more detailed quantitative indicators from the past 25 
years. 
3.2.  OECD data 1986-2009 
Since 1986 the OECD calculates policy support given to agriculture. The total amount of 
support to agriculture is referred to as Producer Support Estimate (PSE). Initially the PSE 
calculations were only for OECD member states but more recently also some other 
countries, such as China and Brazil, are covered. The PSE data cover 28 countries, 12 of 
which are not OECD members, over the period 1986-2009. For countries not belonging 
to the OECD, the time coverage is not complete: the first year observation is around 
1990-92 and the last is 2007. The OECD’s calculation of policy support distinguishes 
between several instruments. Table 2 presents an overview of instruments used in OECD 
countries. 
For the purpose of our analysis it is convenient to combine the instruments into 
’market price support’ (mps), ‘input subsidies’ (is) and ‘direct payments’ (dp). The first 
instrument, mps, includes all transfers through tariffs, price support and subsidies directly 
linked to agricultural production. These instruments are typically considered as being the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
instruments for governments to regulate markets and prices to support producers in the 1950s, when 
economic growth caused a growing rural-urban income gap. - 13 - 
most distortive. The second instrument, is, are input subsidies and cover a very 
heterogeneous set of measures, spanning from investment aids and labor subsidies to land 
protection programs. Finally, the third instrument, dp, includes fully decoupled and 
partially decoupled agricultural payments. These instruments are generally considered the 
least distortive. 
To compare these policy instruments across country and over time, we consider 
their share in total support (PSE), mpsh, ish, and dpsh, respectively. Table 2 and Figure 1 
present the evolution of instruments used. In the late 1980s, by far the most important 
instrument was mps. The share of market price support in total support was 82%, whereas 
direct payments made up only 10%, and inputs subsidies 8%. Interesting, however, Table 
2 and Figure 1 illustrate how in the next two decades there was a dramatic change in 
instrument choice. The share of market price support has declined and that of direct 
payments increased substantially. By the late 2000s the former had decreased to 49% and 
the later increased to 61%. In contrast, the share of input subsidies remained about the 
same. 
Table 3 illustrates that there are large variations among countries. In 1986 the mpsh 
varied from 56% in Canada to 100% in Lithuania, and the dpsh varied from 0% in several 
countries to 37% in the US.
11 Also in recent years there remain large differences across 
countries with, for example, the dpsh varying from 0%-1% in South Africa and Chile to 
60% in the EU. 
  Our previous historical analysis suggested correlations between the choice of 
instrument and (a) the level of development; and (b) the URAA GATT agreement. The 
                                                           
11 The negative numbers for China and Mexico mean that in those country-years agriculture was taxed, not 
subsidized.  - 14 - 
OECD data are consistent with this. First, when we correlate the share of support given 
through direct payments, dpsh, with an indicator for development (per capita GDP) in 
Figure 2, we do observe a positive empirical correlation across this countries. There is a 
similar positive relationship between development and the level of direct payments per 
unit of output (dp/q) (see Figure 3).  
Second, Figure 1 indicates that the shift from market price support to direct 
payments started in the early 1990s, which was the time of the conclusion of the URAA 
and has continued during the Doha WTO negotiations. 
In addition, when we correlate the share of transfers coming from market price 
support, mpsh, with a country’s trade status (net export share) in Figure 4, we observe a 
strong negative empirical correlation. A similar negative relationship exists when the 
amount of mps per unit of output (mps/q), instead of the share, is used (see Figure 5). 
In summary, this historical and cross-country empirical evidence suggests that the 
choice of instruments is non-random. As stylized facts, we find that the choice of 
instruments is correlated with three factors: (a) a country’s level of development; (b) the 
URAA GATT agreement and the Doha WTO negotiations; and (c) a country’s trade 
status. In the next section of this paper we will develop a theoretical model to explain 
these stylized observations.  
4.  Theory 
4.1.  The Model 
We use the same static framework as most models in the literature and consider the 
choice of governments between instruments in the absence of existing policies (see e.g. 
Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Foster and Rausser, 1993; Kono, 2006). We assume that - 15 - 
governments have perfect information on the impact of the various policy instruments, so 
there is no room for policy obfuscation. Consider that for some reason, e.g. a dramatic 
decline in world market prices for agricultural products, the government introduces 
policies to support producers’ incomes.
12  
We assume that the government has two different policy instruments at its disposal 
(see e.g. Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Rodrik, 1986; Coate and Morris, 1995) to transfer 
income to producers: instruments t and s, which are assumed to have the following 
characteristics: 
 Distortions  Transaction  Costs  Impact on Government 
Revenue 
t  High Low  Positive if net importing; 
Negative if net exporting 
s  Low High Strongly  negative 
 
Policy t has low transaction costs but high costs of market distortions, and has a positive 
(negative) impact on government revenue if the country is a net importer (exporter). 
Policy s causes fewer distortions but is characterized by high transaction costs, and has a 
strongly negative impact on government revenue, independent of the country’s trade 
status. Even if the country is a net exporter, the impact of instrument s on government 
revenue is more negative than instrument t’s impact. One could think of tariffs vis-à-vis 
lump-sum transfers, or market price support vis-à-vis direct income support as examples 
of policies t and s, respectively.  
As in Kono (2006), we assume that governments need both voter support and 
money to stay in power. Money can be raised both through interest-group contributions 
                                                           
12 There is considerable evidence (Gardner, 1987; Swinnen et al., 2001) and theoretical explanations (de 
Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Swinnen, 1994) that governments support agriculture when market conditions - 16 - 
and through revenues from the implementation of policy instruments. Our assumptions 
imply a modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of government decision-making 
where, in line with Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2000), the government maximizes a 
weighted sum of interest group contributions, policy revenues, and total voter support: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , ; ,
RV Gts Cts Rts Vts ωα β ω =+ + , (1) 
where G  is government utility, C  are the interest-group contributions, R  measures the 
budgetary costs or revenues of the policy instruments, and V  is total voter support. t and 
s are the income transfers of the two policy instruments, and  ( )
R ω α  and 
V ω  are the 
weights that the government gives to respectively revenue considerations and total voter 
support. β  represents the trade balance of that country, and α  is an inverse measure for 
a country’s institutional development. In developing countries – with relatively 
underdeveloped institutions – raising revenue through foreign trade taxes constitutes the 
single largest source of public revenue (Burgess and Stern, 1993; Rodrik, 1995; Bates and 
Block, 2010). The revenue motive is therefore substantially more imperative in countries 
with less developed institutions. Since α  inversely measures the country’s institutional 
development, we assume that the weight attached by the government to the revenue 




> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the interest group consists of 
active lobbyists that solicit income transfers from the government. For this purpose the 
interest group offers the government a schedule that lists the interest group’s 
contributions as a function of the income transfers. The interest-group contributions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
worsen for farmers. - 17 - 
() , Cts rise with the level of the income transfers ( ) 0; 0 ts CC >> , but at a decreasing 
rate () 0; 0; 0 tt ss ts CCC <<< .
13 
The policy revenue function  ( ) ,; R tsβ  is assumed to be decreasing in policy 
instrument s () 0 s R < , whereas the revenue impact of instrument t can be either positive 
() 0 t R >  or negative () 0 t R < , depending on the trade status of the country (respectively 
net importing or net exporting). We assume that  s t R R <  to represent that instrument s 
has a highly negative impact on government revenue, even more negative than instrument 
t in the case of a net-exporting country.  ( ) , R ts is concave in the income transfers 
() 0; 0; 0 tt ss ts RRR <<< . In line with the marginal impact of instrument t being 
respectively positive and negative for a net-importing and net-exporting country, the 
impact of an increase in the trade balance, β , on instrument t’s marginal revenue impact 
is negative, i.e.  0 t R β < . The negative revenue impact of instrument s is independent of 
the trade balance:  0 s R β = . 
The function for total voter support,  ( ) , Vts, is given by 
  () ( ) ,,
ts Vts Wts b t b s α α =− − , (2) 
where the first term,  () , Wts, represents total voter welfare, and the second and third 
terms, 
t bt α  and 
s bs α , measure the total transaction costs related to each instrument. As 
before,  α  is an inverse measure for the country’s institutional development. In an 
unfavourable institutional environment where institutions are underdeveloped and the 
                                                           
13 Subscripts t  and s  denote partial derivatives. - 18 - 
administrative capacity is low, transaction costs are higher for the same amount of 
income transfer (Burgess and Stern, 1993). Since policy t involves lower transaction 
costs than policy s for the same amount of income transfer, we assume that  0
st bb >≥ . 
Hence 
t bα  and 
s b α  are the average transaction costs per unit of the income transfers t  
and s. 
As both policy instruments are distortionary measures,  ( ) , Wts is decreasing in the 
income transfers ( ) 0; 0 ts WW <<  at an increasing rate ( ) 0; 0; 0 tt ss ts WWW < << . 
Instrument t is more distorting than instrument s, so  ts WW < . 
  The equilibrium pair of income transfers ( )
** , ts is determined by the first order 
conditions (FOCs):
14 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( )( ) ()
,, ; , 0





G C ts R ts W ts b
G C ts R ts W ts b
ωα β ω ωα
ωα β ω ω α
⎧ =+ + − = ⎪
⎨ =+ + − = ⎪ ⎩
 (3) 
                                                           









. In order to obtain 
a global maximum and to perform comparative statics, this matrix must be negative definite. Since all the 
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, the matrix is negative definite if 
()
2 det 0 tt ss ts HG GG =− >  (Winston, 2004). To secure uniqueness of the equilibrium and reaction 
function stability, in line with Brander and Spencer (1983) and Dixit (1984), we assume that the own 
effects of the income transfers on marginal contributions, revenue, and total voter welfare exceed cross 







 as the share of policy t in the total income transfer. We now 









 for changes in the 
institutional development of a country, α , and the country’s trade balance, β . 












< < : 
* 0 dh dα > . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Result 1 implies that when total transaction costs are higher and the revenue motive is 
more important due to lower institutional capacity, ceteris paribus, the relative share of 
income transfer 
* t  increases in equilibrium. Hence countries with less developed 
institutions (α  higher) will apply relatively more distorting policies (
* h  larger), provided 
that the transaction costs of the more distorting policy are sufficiently lower than that of 










, and that the less distorting policy has a sufficiently more 








. The latter condition is always 
fulfilled if the more distorting policy has a positive impact on government revenue 
() 0 t R > . 
To illustrate this result, take the specific case of a net-importing country. In that 
case, 0 t R > , and the second condition is fulfilled. If in addition the more distorting - 20 - 
instrument () t  involves no transaction costs, i.e.  0
t b = , the first condition holds as well. 
It is clear from Result 1 and the proof in Appendix that in this specific case, an increase 
of the institutional development of a country (α  lower) will always result in a higher 
relative share of the less distorting policy instrument 
* s  in equilibrium (
* h  smaller). The 
result also holds under less strict conditions, which are discussed in Appendix. 
Result 2: 
* 0 dh dβ < . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Result 2 implies that if the trade balance of a country increases (β  increases), the relative 
share of the more distorting policy in the total income transfer decreases (
* h  decreases). 
For example, if for some exogenous reason a country’s imports decrease, ceteris paribus, 
the country will shift to using the less distorting policy relatively more, although it 
involves relatively higher transaction costs. 
4.2.  GATT/WTO 
GATT and WTO negotiations may have an important impact on the equilibrium choice of 
instruments. GATT/WTO regulations distinguish between instruments according to their 
distortionary impact and limit the use of distorting measures while non-distorting 
measures are not regulated. More specifically, the WTO classifies agricultural policy 
instruments in green, blue and amber boxes – with the green box for non-trade distorting - 21 - 
policies instruments (see Josling and Tangermann, 1999; Tangermann, 1999; Josling, 
2000 for more details). 
To analyze this issue with our model, assume that GATT/WTO regulations put 
restrictions on the use of instrument t but not on instrument s, since the former is more 
distorting than the latter one.
15 Formally, with such a restriction in place, the government 
maximizes its utility function in (1) subject to the condition that  ˆ tt ≤ , where ˆ t  is the 
maximum level of instrument t as imposed by GATT/WTO regulations. We assume this 
constraint to be binding, i.e. that in absence of GATT/WTO regulations the equilibrium 
choice of instrument t would be higher ( )
* ˆ tt >  – otherwise the constraint would have no 
impact on the equilibrium instrument choices and the analysis would be trivial.  
Analyzing the impact of this constraint on the relative share of the more distorting 
policy in total income support is straightforward. The two unconstrained FOCs in (3) can 
be interpreted as a set of two reaction functions,  ( ) ,0 t Gt s=  and  ( ) ,0 s Gt s=  (see Figure 
6).
16 Restricting instrument t to  ˆ tt ≤  is equivalent to cutting off the first reaction 
function,  () ,0 t Gt s= , at  ˆ tt = , for larger values of t. The constrained reaction function 
consists of the inner envelope of  ( ) ,0 t Gt s=  and the vertical line at ˆ t  in Figure 6. In the 
constrained equilibrium, the equilibrium level of instrument t is 
# ˆ tt = , i.e. what is 
maximally allowed under GATT/WTO regulations. As Figure 6 illustrates, the impact of 
the constraint on the level of instrument s is determined by the slope of the second 
                                                           
15 For political economy analyses of international trade agreements such as the GATT/WTO regulations, 
we refer to Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Bagwell and Staiger, 2006; Maggi 
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2007) 
16 For simplicity, Figure 6 assumes that the reaction functions are linear, and that both t  and s  are 
positive. - 22 - 
reaction function,  () ,0 s Gt s= . This reaction function implicitly defines s as a function 
( ) st, such that  () () ,0 s Gt s t = . From the total derivative of the latter expression follows 





=− . Our assumption that 
sst s GG <  (see footnote 14) implies that the slope of this reaction function,  () ,0 s Gt s= , is 
negative but smaller than 1 in absolute value. Therefore, if 
* t  is constrained to 
# ˆ tt =  (i.e. 
lower than 
* t ), it must be that the level of instrument s is higher in the constrained 
equilibrium than in the unconstrained one ( )
#* ss > . This increase is smaller than the 
absolute value of the decrease in instrument t because  1
ds
dt
<  along the second reaction 
function. Since 
#* tt <  and 
#* ss > , it follows unambiguously that 
#* hh < . In other 
words, because of GATT/WTO regulations, the relative share of the more distorting 
policy in total income support decreases. 
5.  Empirical Analysis 
5.1.  Model Specification 
In this section, we formally test whether our theoretical hypotheses are consistent with 
the observed evidence on instrument choices. Following the theoretical model, we select 
two instrument choice indicators as dependent variables. As a proxy for the instrument t 
we use the share of market price support in total support (mpsh). As a proxy for the 
instrument s we use the share of direct payments in total support (dpsh) (see section 3 for 
more details on the two variables).  - 23 - 
Our explanatory variables are the following. First, we proxy the institutional 
development and administrative capacity of a country by real GDP per capita (gdppc), 
taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). A country with a high 
gdppc is expected to have better administrations and institutions to implement, enforce 
and monitor its public policies.  
Second, as an indicator of the economic structure (trade status) we use the net 
export share in total production (exsh), based on FAO data.
17 
Third, to capture the effect of external constraints imposed by international 
agreements, we include a dummy variable, d_gatt. This dummy takes the value of 1 since 
1995 (0 otherwise). We expect the effect to be negative on mpsh but positive on dpsh. 
The GATT Agreement, starting from the 1995 (the first year of the implementation 
period), has introduced more constraints on the use of highly distortionary policy 
instruments like mps, than on lower distortionary instruments, like dp. In fact, fully 
decoupled policies which are not trade distorting are allowed under WTO principles.  
Fourth, to account for path dependency and the persistence of policies, we include 
the level of the dependent variable in the previous period.  
Finally, one may argue that from a conceptual point of view, the empirical model 
should also include the level of support (PSE). By including PSE as explanatory variable, 
one can analyze the relation between the policy level and instrument choice. However, 
there are two econometric reasons that render the inclusion of the level of support in our 
instrument choice equations problematic. First, PSE is endogenous, as the level of 
support is likely to depend itself on the policy instrument. Second, our explanatory 
                                                           
17 More specifically, exsh = (export value – import value) / production value. - 24 - 
variables,  exsh,  gdppc, and d_gatt, are also important determinants of the overall 
protection level. While the first problem could be solved potentially by using a 
simultaneous equation model, the second problem precludes finding good instruments for 
PSE in the mpsh and dpsh equations. We therefore do not include PSE in the regressions. 
Summarizing, in what follows we will run the following specifications:  
it it it it it gatt d exsh gdppc mpsh mpsh ν α α α α α + + + + + = − − − _ 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0  
it it it it it gatt d exsh gdppc dpsh dpsh η β β β β β + + + + + = − − − _ 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0  
 
where  1 α  and  1 β  are expected to be positive; 2 α ,  3 α , and  4 α  are expected to be negative; 
and  2 β ,  3 β , and  4 β  are expected to be positive. The theoretical predictions of the 
coefficient signs are summarized in Table 4. 
  We first run the regressions using OLS and later do robustness tests using 
alternative estimation techniques. 
5.2.  Data 
The empirical model is applied to OECD data on instrument choice in 28 countries over 
the 1986-2009 period (see Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3).  
Before running the regressions we needed to deal with negative values for some 
dependent variables for observations of the non OECD countries (see Table 3). In some 
cases the level of market price support and/or direct payments, as well as other 
instruments (like input subsidies), are negative for some non OECD countries. This raises 
problems when working with mpsh and dpsh. The share of a negative level instrument 
can be higher (lower) than 1 (0), if the total PSE has a value that is higher (lower), 
respectively, than the value of the instrument itself. In the full dataset 13.3% of the 
observations have negative values for mpsh and 7.2% for dpsh. - 25 - 
We tried to deal with this problem in three different ways. First, we recalculated 
mpsh and dpsh variables using absolute values of each instrument.
18 Notice that for all 
the observations without negative values this has no effect on the mpsh or dpsh value. 
This dataset is referred to as “All” in the regression results. Second, we ran the 
regressions with the original dataset but excluding the negative values for mpsh or dpsh. 
This dataset is referred to as “NoNegVal”. Finally, we ran the regressions with the 
subsample of the OECD member countries only, where there are no negative values. This 
dataset is referred to as “OECD”. 
5.3.  Results 
The OLS regressions of our empirical specifications are reported in Table 5. All the 
relevant variables have their expected signs and are statistically significant at the 95% 
level or more. Moreover, the adjusted R
2 of the models, ranging from 0.58 to 0.80, 
indicates the high explanatory power of the selected variables.  
Moreover, the model results are robust across different samples suggesting that how 
we treat the problem of negative values does not affect our conclusions. Indeed, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are very close in the samples. The only significant 
difference is the explanatory power of the model which is somewhat higher when the 
NoNegVal or the OECD sample are used.  
gdppc has a significant negative effect on mpsh, the share of market price support, 
and gdppc a significant positive effect on dpsh, the share of direct income support. These 
results are consistent with our theoretical argument that countries with lower 
                                                           
18 The exact formula used is as follows: |pse| = |mps| + |dp| + |is|. Then the share of market price support and 
direct payments in total support was calculated as |mpsh| = |mps|/|pse| and |dp|/|pse|. - 26 - 
administrative capacity and lower institutional development have a preference for price 
support. Also in line with our hypothesis, the net export share has a significant negative 
effect on mpsh, and a positive and significant effect on dpsh. 
The 1994 GATT Agreement as captured by the dummy d_gatt is significantly 
negatively correlated with mpsh, and positively with dpsh. These results are consistent 
with the argument that the GATT constraints exert an effect on instrument choices: mpsh 
declined on average after the implementation of the 1994 GATT agreement, and dpsh 
increased. 
In all regressions the coefficients of the lagged value of the dependent variable are 
positive and strongly significant. The magnitude of the lagged coefficients, ranging from 
0.66 to 0.86, confirm a strong level of persistency in instrument choice.  
5.4.  Robustness Tests 
We performed a series of additional robustness test of our main findings. First, a potential 
problem in applying OLS to our specification is that the lagged dependent variable can be 
endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, which gives the well know dynamic 
panel bias (see, e.g., Roodman, 2009). A first step to deal with this is by removing the 
fixed effects from the error term, running the standard Least Square with Dummy 
Variables (LSDV) estimator. In doing so, we also control for any unobserved 
heterogeneity that are correlated with our explanatory variables.  
Table 6 reports the LSDV regression results. First, taken together, the fixed effects 
are jointly significant suggesting that their inclusion is correct. As expected, the estimated 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are lower in magnitude, but still strongly 
significant. Second, all the estimated coefficients retain their expected signs and are - 27 - 
almost always significantly different from zero. There is an increase in the (absolute) 
magnitude of the gdppc effect. The estimated coefficient of exsh loses its significance in 
the mpsh regressions, when the ALL sample is considered, and in the dpsh regression 
when the OECD sample is considered. However, the main conclusion from the fixed 
effects model is that all our key predictions appear quite robust to this specification, but 
the effect of the trade status, although going in the direction predicted by the theory and 
often significant, is estimated with less precision. 
As is well know, a potential problem with the LSDV estimator is that, when applied 
to a panel structure where the year dimension, T, is lower than the number of individual 
(countries)  N, then this dynamic panel estimator may also be biased, due to the 
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. In our specific case, this gives some 
potential problems with the full dataset (ALL). Indeed, in that case we are in a borderline 
situation with T slightly lower than N.
19  
To address this potential source of bias, the system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is used. This means estimating a system with the first-
differences and the level equations, where the endogenous variables are instrumented by 
their level in the first-differenced equation and first-differenced instruments for the 
equation in level. Results of these additional regressions for the full dataset are reported 
in Table 7. The bottom of Table 7 shows the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and 
the Hansen test to check for the consistency of the GMM estimator. The Arellano-Bond 
test indicates the presence of first order serial correlation, but no second order serial 
                                                           
19 Specifically, in the OECD sample the average (minimum) years of observations T = 20 (13) with N = 16. 
Differently, in the overall sample the average (minimum) T = 18 (11) with N = 28. Note however that, 
when  T  is around 20, the estimation bias in the dependent variable is between 2% and 3%. More 
importantly, the bias on the other explanatory variables is less than 1% (see Judson and Owen, 1999). - 28 - 
correlation, suggesting that the model dynamic is correctly specified. Moreover, the 
standard Hansen test confirms that in all cases our set of instruments is valid.
20  
As is clear from the numbers reported in Table, these additional robustness checks 
provide further support to our previous conclusions. Indeed, also in the system GMM 
regressions the trade status and the level of development, affect negatively the share of 
market price support, but positively the share of direct payments. Finally, once again the 
GATT dummy indicates that this international agreement contributed to a shift towards 
direct income support away from market price support, and the lagged dependent variable 
indicates strong persistency of policy instruments.  
6.  Conclusion 
A survey of European agricultural price and trade policy instruments from 1880 to 2009 
revealed a clear pattern from simple trade barriers (tariffs) to increasingly complex but 
still very distorting mechanisms of producer support. In recent decades, moves towards 
less distorting mechanisms of intervention have been made.  
  We developed a theoretical political economy model in this paper to explain these 
choices and how various factors may affect these choices on policy instruments. The 
theoretical model provides an explanation for general observations on policy instrument 
use: (a) their correlation with the level of a country’s institutional development; (b) their 
correlation with a country’s net trade position; and (c) the impact of GATT/WTO 
negotiations. Moreover, the model explains these key observations without having to rely 
                                                           
20 According to Roodman (2009), the instrument count does not exceed the number of groups and, to 
control for instrument proliferation that cause a weak Hansen test, we used the xtabond2 collapse option in 
STATA, instead of all available lags for instruments. - 29 - 
on imperfect information of policy effects by consumers or taxpayers or on theories of 
bureaucratic inertia and obstruction.  
  In the last part of the paper we econometrically tested these theoretical predictions 
using OECD data on instrument choice in agricultural policy. Our empirical analysis 
confirms the hypotheses and provides strong evidence that the shift from distortionary to 
less distortionary instruments is positively influenced by institutional development, the 
net trade status, and the GATT/WTO framework. Moreover, we also find evidence of 
strong persistency of policy instruments. - 30 - 
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Table 1 Introduction of trade and price policy among European countries 
Instrument  Commodity  Country  Date 





Meat, livestock (grains free) 





















2. Non-Tariff Barriers       








Import quota  Most agricultural (except 
 wheat) 











Meat, butter, pigs 






Milk, butter and cheese 
 sugar beet 
Potatoes, sugar-beet, fruits 










































6. Target price and Intervention with 
Threshold prices linked to Variable 
Import Levies
























4  Main CAP products  EU-15, -27  2005 
Notes:
 (1) ‘Market organization’ refers to the use of combinations of instruments such as: state trade 
monopolies, marketing boards, state food corporations, intervention purchases, and subsidies in addition to 
numerous border measures.
 (2) Variable import levies and associated threshold prices have been abolished in 
1995 under the Uruguay Round Agreements of GATT.
 (3) Payments made to producers to compensate for 
reduced price support under the MacSharry and later CAP reforms. 
(4) Payments introduced under the 2003 
Fischler CAP reform. 
Source: Own interpretation of Tracy (1989, 1996), Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra (1985) and 
Swinnen (2009; 2010). 
 
 






Table 2. Support by policy instrument based on OECD PSE database 
Value Share Value Share
Market price support 195,839 0.82 125,215 0.49
Input subsidies 20,400 0.09 33,403 0.13
Direct payments 22,425 0.09 98,146 0.38
Total PSE  (Milions US $) 238,665 1.00 256,764 1.00
Percentage PSE 
1986-88 2007-09
37 22  
Notes: The policy instruments considered are based on the following items of the PSE database: ‘market 
price support’ refers to support based on commodity outputs (items A1 and A2, of the PSE database); 
‘input subsidies’ is the sum of payments based on input use and miscellaneous payments (items B and G); 
‘direct payments’ refer to different payments decoupled or partially decoupled from production (items from 
C to F).  
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010). - 38 - 
 
Table 3. Share of market price support, input subsidies and direct payments in PSE 
Instrument share mpsh ish dpsh mpsh ish dpsh
E u r o p e a n  U n i o n 0 . 9 20 . 0 50 . 0 3 0 . 2 50 . 1 40 . 6 0
United States 0.44 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.30 0.51
A u s t r a l i a 0 . 7 50 . 1 70 . 0 8 0 . 0 00 . 5 10 . 4 9
S w i t z e r l a n d 0 . 8 30 . 1 00 . 0 7 0 . 5 40 . 0 60 . 4 1
Norway 0.72 0.10 0.18 0.55 0.05 0.40
Latvia 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.36 0.38
Canada 0.56 0.16 0.28 0.58 0.07 0.35
China 1.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.21 0.48 0.31
Slovakia 0.88 0.08 0.04 0.51 0.19 0.31
I c e l a n d 0 . 9 30 . 0 70 . 0 0 0 . 6 50 . 0 80 . 2 7
Czech Republic 0.82 0.05 0.14 0.64 0.11 0.25
Ukraine 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.37 0.24
Slovenia 0.88 0.09 0.03 0.73 0.05 0.22
M e x i c o - 1 . 5 32 . 5 30 . 0 0 0 . 3 50 . 4 30 . 2 2
E s t o n i a 0 . 8 80 . 1 00 . 0 1 0 . 5 10 . 3 20 . 1 7
H u n g a r y 0 . 8 00 . 0 60 . 1 4 0 . 5 40 . 3 00 . 1 6
L i t h u a n i a 1 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0 0 . 6 30 . 2 30 . 1 4
J a p a n 0 . 9 30 . 0 40 . 0 3 0 . 8 80 . 0 30 . 0 9
Turkey 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.05
K o r e a 0 . 9 90 . 0 00 . 0 0 0 . 9 20 . 0 30 . 0 5
R o m a n i a 0 . 9 60 . 0 30 . 0 0 0 . 8 90 . 0 70 . 0 4
N e w  Z e a l a n d 0 . 1 90 . 4 80 . 3 2 0 . 4 20 . 5 50 . 0 3
Russia 0.65 0.24 0.11 0.54 0.44 0.03
Brazil 1.31 -0.31 0.00 0.53 0.46 0.02
Poland 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.60 0.38 0.01
C h i l e 0 . 9 60 . 0 40 . 0 0 0 . 1 30 . 8 60 . 0 1
South Africa 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.69 0.31 0.00
Bulgaria 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.69 0.00
1986 2009
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by their 2009 values of dpsh; For new EU member states, the last year 
corresponds to 2003; for non OECD countries, like South Africa, Chile, Brazil, Russia, and China the first 
year is around 1990-92 and the last is 2007.  
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010). 
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Table 4. Model predictions  
mpsh dpsh
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Table 5. Instrument choice regression results  
Dependent variable
OLS regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gdppc -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0024 0.0015 0.0013 0.0017
2.98*** 2.99*** 3.34*** 4.14*** 3.43*** 3.71***
exsh -0.0650 -0.0469 -0.0641 0.0132 0.0116 0.0185
5.51*** 4.31*** 8.58*** 1.45 1.64 2.29**
d_GATT -0.0511 -0.0489 -0.0448 0.0197 0.0158 0.0299
4.03*** 4.27*** 3.21*** 3.16*** 3.05*** 2.34**
Lagged_mpsh (dpsh) 0.6608 0.7698 0.7214 0.8038 0.8606 0.8102
13.99*** 16.95*** 13.56*** 19.01*** 24.65*** 20.77***
Dataset All NoNegVal OECD All NoNegVal OECD
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO
Obs. 517 448 326 517 480 326
Countries 28 28 16 28 28 16
F-Statistic 82.4 143.3 106.8 152.6 334.6 360.2
Adjusted R
2 0.58 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.80
mpsh dpsh
 
Notes: t-statistics based on clustered standard errors under the coefficients. All regressions include also a constant term. ***, ** and * p-value < 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6. Robustness check: Fixed effect regressions 
Dependent variable
LSDV regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gdppc -0.0107 -0.0079 -0.0114 0.0085 0.0072 0.0083
3.50*** 2.46** 2.95*** 3.98*** 3.08*** 2.31**
exsh -0.0571 -0.0804 -0.1096 0.0444 0.0453 0.0792
1.28 2.00* 1.86* 1.77* 1.69* 1.58
d_gatt -0.0472 -0.0600 -0.0366 0.0273 0.0279 0.0404
2.46** 3.84*** 2.11** 2.42** 3.12*** 4.44***
Lagged_mpsh (dpsh) 0.4582 0.6042 0.5378 0.5671 0.6395 0.5638
8.29*** 7.12*** 4.14*** 8.82*** 8.13*** 4.37***
Dataset All NoNegVal OECD All NoNegVal OECD
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 517 448 326 517 480 326
Countries 28 28 16 28 28 16
F-Statistic 78.7 88.3 92.3 197.8 216.4 243.1
Adjusted R
2 0.64 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.85
mpsh dpsh
 
Notes: t-statistics based on clustered standard errors under the coefficients. ***, ** and * p-value < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 7. Robustness check: System GMM regressions 
Dependent variable
One Step Two Step One Step Two Step
(1) (2) (3) (4)
gdppc -0.0035 -0.0036 0.0023 0.0027
3.21*** 2.94*** 2.70** 2.93***
exsh -0.1147 -0.1190 0.0195 0.0162
5.06*** 4.78*** 1.19 1.01
d_gatt -0.0882 -0.0871 0.0309 0.0274
4.15*** 4.00*** 4.14*** 3.48***
Lagged_mpsh (dpsh) 0.395 0.405 0.693 0.686
4.83*** 4.72*** 7.58*** 7.62***
Sample All All All All
Obs. 517 517 517 517
Countries 28 28 28 28
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27
Test for AR(1): Pr > z  0.000 0.002 0.003 0.015
Test for AR(2): Pr > z  0.245 0.334 0.246 0.241




Notes: t-statistics based on robust standard error under the coefficients. The System GMM estimator is implemented in STATA using the xtabond2 routine, with 
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Figure 1. Evolution of total PSE and its coupled (mpsh) and decoupled (dpsh) 
components in the OECDs . 
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Figure 2. Relation between the share of direct payments in total support (dpsh) and 
the level of development, average values 1986-2009.  
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Figure 3. Relation between the level of direct payment support (dp/q) and the level of 
development, average values 1986-2009.  
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Figure 4. Relation between the share of market price support in total support 
(mpsh) and the net export share (exsh), average values 1986-2009. See text. 
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Figure 5. Relation between the level of market price support (mps/q) and the net 
export share (exsh), average values 1986-2009. 
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010) - 46 - 
 
Figure 6.   The Impact of GATT/WTO Regulations on Instrument Choice 
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Appendix 
Proof of Result 1:  
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From the assumptions to secure uniqueness of the equilibrium and reaction function 






< . (7) 
Performing comparative statics on 
* h  gives 
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Using (6) and (7), it immediately follows that 
* 0 dh dα > .   ■ 
 
The conditions imposed under Result 1 are stricter than necessary. Substituting Equations 
(4) and (5) into Equation (8) and rearranging gives the following condition for 
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 (9) 
It is clear that condition (9) also holds, such that 
* 0 dh dα > , for several cases that 
violate the conditions imposed in Result 1. For example, condition (9) is satisfied when 
one of the two conditions is violated, but the other condition is sufficiently non-binding. 
Also, at 
** ts = , condition (9) holds when  tt ss GG ≅ . Hence Result 1 is more general than 
what the two conditions seem to suggest – the attractiveness of these two conditions is in 
their intuitive interpretation. 
 
Proof of Result 2:  
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Performing comparative statics on 
* h  gives 
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Using (12), it follows that 
* 0 dh dβ < .   ■ 
 